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## The Post-Mortems

It is not surprising that post-mortems concerning the abortive attempt last week of Cuban exiles to establish a beachhead in their homeland put a stress on factors of mismanagement and miscalculation. In the hours after the landings, and the first flush of hope that a drive to topple the Castro government had been mounted, it became obvious that the assault was in trouble and that there had been shoddy planning somewhere along the line.

Principle emphasis in the reviews of the setback is being placed upon poor intelligence which under-estimated Castro's hold on the internal Cuban situation, the capacity of the Cuban people to time an uprising with the landings and the strength and professionalism of Castro's military forces.

Neither Cuban nor U.S. intelligence agencies were aware, for instance, that Castro had Soviet Mig fighter planes in flying condition. It was known that planes of that type were in Cuba, but they were thought to be in crates. Events not only proved that the planes were in operational order, but possibly were flown by Communist-trained pilots. The planes strafed landing points heavily.

It also is becoming clear that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency had a strong hand in the preparations for the landings and that while there were some misgivings about the operation, the CIA, Secretary of State Rusk and Defense Secretary McNamara agreed with President Kennedy's decision not to discourage the attack.

Furthermore, it has been learned authoritatively that the Joint Chiefs of Staff studied the rebels' landing plans and found them feasible provided that the intelligence estimates of Castro's political and military strength were exact. Unfortunately, it was on the vital point of intelligence that the preparations went astray. A major miscalculation was that involved in the failure to assess the degree to which Soviet and Communist-bloc technicians had bolstered Castro's military and police arms.

The evidence of mishandling, for that it amounts to a mere bitter confirmation of what had been deduced by all who followed last week's events carefully, is further support of the challenge that there are lessons to be learned from this tragic episode and that they must be learned. Because the consequences of the setback have been grave, the need to profit from them is compelling.